### T

#### A. Interpretation: Energy production is the making of electricity, fuel, or heating/cooling

NASA No Date

(http://www.sti.nasa.gov/sscg/44.html; kdf)

Energy Production – The production of electricity, combustible fuel**s**, nuclear and thermonuclear fuels, and heating and cooling by renewable resources.

#### And, “in the United States” means within the states and territories of the US

State Department 9

[“Acquisition and Retention of U.S. Citizenship and Nationality,” 21 August 2009, <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86755.pdf> // myost]

7 FAM 1112 WHAT IS BIRTH “IN THE UNITED STATES”? (CT:CON-314; 08-21-2009) a. INA 101(a)(38) (8 U.S.C. 1101 (a)(38)) provides that “the term ‘United States,’ when used in a geographical sense, means the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands of the United States.”

#### B. Violation: SPS’s electricity production takes place in outer space – only transmission occurs within the United States

Betancourt 10

[Kiantar, third-year student at the University of Maryland School of Law, specializing in environmental and international law, “Solar Power: Worth the Effort?” 28 Aug 2010, <http://www.spaceenergy.com/announcements/space-based-solar-power-worth-the-effort-kiantar-betancourt> // myost]

SBSP has the potential to fulfill the planets growing energy needs in the coming centuries.[13] The concept of SBSP is simple. Satellites are sent into space fitted with solar panels that can convert the sun’s rays into electricity.[14] This electricity is then converted into microwaves and is then transmitted back to a receiver on the planet’s surface.[15] The receiver on the planet’s surface converts the microwaves back into electricity where it can be fed into the power grid.[16] Any company or country seeking to implement this technology faces certain legal and technical challenges. However the promise of SBSP is worth the cost of overcoming these challenges.

#### And, outer space is a global commons beyond the jurisdiction of the United States.

CSIS 10

[Center for Strategic & International Studies, “Space and the Global Commons,” 16 Apr 2010, [http://csis.org/blog/space-and-global-commons //](http://csis.org/blog/space-and-global-commons%20//) myost]

The idea of a global commons is not a new concept. The high seas, the sea-bed and its minerals, Antarctica, the atmosphere and outer space are considered global commons in international law. Global commons are areas that no one country has sovereignty over and its resources can be used by all, or, at least by those who have the technological capabilities to explore those resources. According to the UN, a commons is owned by all members in a community and is beyond the jurisdiction of any one nation. So how does out space fit in with the concept of the global commons?

#### C. Standards:

#### 1. Predictable limits – the aff justifies an unlimited number of unpredictable affs which increase energy production outside the United States; all neg research is premised on domestic energy production. Their interp means the aff wins every time since they can pick an obscure plan based around any number of tiny countries.

#### 2. Extra-T – even if the aff wins they convert microwaves into electricity in the US, their advantages depend on electricity converted from solar power in outer space. Extra-T is an independent voter since they can outweigh all our disads with action that falls outside the resolution.

#### D. T’s a voter for competitive equity and education, and should be evaluated via competing interpretations. Reasonability mandates judge intervention and arbitrary interpretations of the resolution.

### K

#### The AFF’s approach to reduction of the natural world to a means of securing energy enframes existence, stripping beings of their very essence.

Beckman 0

[Tad, Harvey Mudd College, “Martin Heidegger and Environmental Ethics,” [http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html] //](http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html%5D%20//) myost

To uncover the essence of modern technology is to discover why technology stands today as the danger. To accomplish this insight, we must understand why modern technology must be viewed as a "challenging-forth," what affect this has on our relationship with nature, and how this relationship affects us. Is there really a difference? Has technology really left the domain of techne in a significant way? In modern technology, has human agency withdrawn in some way beyond involvement and, instead, acquired an attitude of violence with respect to the other causal factors? Heidegger clearly saw the development of "energy resources" as symbolic of this evolutionary path; while the transformation into modern technology undoubtedly began early, the first definitive signs of its new character began with the harnessing of energy resources, as we would say. [(7)](http://www2.hmc.edu/~tbeckman/personal/Heidart.html#N_7_) As a representative of the old technology, the windmill took energy from the wind but converted it immediately into other manifestations such as the grinding of grain; the windmill did not unlock energy from the wind in order to store it for later arbitrary distribution. Modern wind-generators, on the other hand, convert the energy of wind into electrical power which can be stored in batteries or otherwise. The significance of storage is that it places the energy at our disposal; and because of this storage the powers of nature can be turned back upon itself. The storing of energy is, in this sense, the symbol of our over-coming of nature as a potent object. "...a tract of land is challenged into the putting out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit." {[7], p. 14} This and other examples that Heidegger used throughout this essay illustrate the difference between a technology that diverts the natural course cooperatively and modern technology that achieves the unnatural by force. Not only is this achieved by force but it is achieved by placing nature in our subjective context, setting aside natural processes entirely, and conceiving of all revealing as being relevant only to human subjective needs. The essence of technology originally was a revealing of life and nature in which human intervention deflected the natural course while still regarding nature as the teacher and, for that matter, the keeper. The essence of modern technology is a revealing of phenomena, often far removed from anything that resembles "life and nature," in which human intrusion not only diverts nature but fundamentally changes it. As a mode of revealing, technology today is a challenging-forth of nature so that the technologically altered nature of things is always a situation in which nature and objects wait, standing in reserve for our use. We pump crude oil from the ground and we ship it to refineries where it is fractionally distilled into volatile substances and we ship these to gas stations around the world where they reside in huge underground tanks, standing ready to power our automobiles or airplanes. Technology has intruded upon nature in a far more active mode that represents a consistent direction of domination. Everything is viewed as "standing-reserve" and, in that, loses its natural objective identity. The river, for instance, is not seen as a river; it is seen as a source of hydro-electric power, as a water supply, or as an avenue of navigation through which to contact inland markets. In the era of techne humans were relationally involved with other objects in the coming to presence; in the era of modern technology, humans challenge-forth the subjectively valued elements of the universe so that, within this new form of revealing, objects lose their significance to anything but their subjective status of standing-ready for human design. (8)

#### The AFF is rife with examples of a thematic framing of human beings as benevolent protectors of the environment – monitoring, manipulating and controlling nature to ensure it functions in a systematically predictable way. This is a dangerous illusion that promotes futile managerial approaches to an untameable natural world.

Kuletz 98

[Valerie Kuletz, University of Canterbury. *The Tainted Desert: Environmental and Social Ruin in the American West*. New York: Routledge, 1998. 285-287.] // myost

We have seen how comparing two sets of perceptions about the environment and their intellectual lineages—the traditional Indian (specifically, the Western Shoshone, Southern Paiute, and Owens Valley Paiute) and the Western scientific—illuminates the limitations of each perspective, while simultaneously placing the two discourses on equal epistemological footing in such a way that one does not dominate the other due to its greater political power, or, as Bourdieu would say, "cultural capital."2 In some respects, this balancing act is an artificial one since Euroamerican scientific representations of the region enjoy far more legitimacy and political prestige than those of the region's indigenous population. Nevertheless, moving from one view to the other assists us in opening intellectual horizons onto the diversity of knowledge about place and nature that exist in this desert region. Comparing the two knowledge systems shows how environmental science, as a discipline and as practiced at Yucca Mountain, exists within a specific cultural and political context (and is a product of a specific cultural tradition), in the same way that Indian traditional knowledge about environment exists within a cultural context. However, because environmental science is the dominant narrative, its truth claims are "naturalized," that is, taken out of their cultural context and perceived as self-evident, so much so the the narratives that science constructs about the natural world become resistant to critical scrutiny, especially from those outside the discipline itself.3 The brief history of ecology, and ecosystems ecology in particular, in Chapter 9 illuminates some of the cultural and political factors that influence the Euroamerican perception of nature and that inform the Yucca Mountain Project—factors that exclude alternative perspectives that might jeopardize the project's implied political objective. By examining these factors in the larger context, we begin to see the powerful role of metaphors in scientific knowledge productions. They reveal the unstated assumptions from which we grasp the natural world and interpret it. When we describe the extended Yucca Mountain region as an "outdoor laboratory," the experimental landscape becomes a metaphorical landscape as much as a material reality. Metaphoricity and materiality are not, for human beings, separate entities. In using language science situates itself within culture and manifests a cultural production. Cybernetic terminology imposes human mechanistic, electrochemical conceptualizations onto nature; to a large extent people comprehend nature through their cultural productions—texts and machines. In this respect nature is what we make it. The ecosystem perspective identifies nature with energy conceptualized as work, with productivity conceptualized as the capacity to produce consumable materials, and with efficiency—all words that help to build an industrial, cybernetic-oriented, and economistic society. As the metaphors used to describe natural processes change through time from Clements's organism to Odum's electro-chemical circuit machine, it becomes impossible not to see our current late industrial, technocratic society reflected in our science. Today, the environmental economic discourse on productivity, with its organization of ecosystems according to capacities of "worldwide annual gross primary production"4 (see Figure 9.5) places Yucca Mountain as exceedingly low in the hierarchy of productivity, and thus deems it appropriate for nuclear waste disposal. But whose "productivity" are we talking about? Certainly not that of the Western Shoshone or Southern Paiute who have subsisted on the mountain's plants, animals, and water and who value the land in quite a different way. Science relies heavily on metaphors when representing nature.5 Ecology and, more specifically, the concept of the ecosystem are no exceptions. Here, economic and social metaphors proliferate to describe and explain nature. Many of these linguistic terms are politically motivated and are assertions of the status quo (stability, functionalist order, capitalist economics). Ironically, today, Indian pronouncements about nature are often dismissed as politically motivated. Why isn't such a phrase as "productive hierarchy" not seen as politically and culturally motivated, crafted to organize nature according to consumer interests? Indians claim that the land is sacred or holy homeland and thus should be under the care of the Native peoples. Capitalist Euroamericans say the land is resource rich and highly productive or unproductive and therefore should be used in various ways: for human consumption or for waste dumps. Which group—Native Americans or Euroamericans— is the more politically motivated? Our representations of the world wield great power. By identifying Yucca Mountain as a wasteland we legitimate actions that turn it into a wasteland. When we fill it with high-level nuclear waste, our actions suggest a belief that the earth is inert (because we need it to be) despite our knowledge of its dynamism. We downplay or ignore knowledge of a huge regional aquifer, numerous shallow volcanic aquifers, earthquake activity, and potential volcanic activity. Even in this dry, quiet landscape with its dense enduring rock, water moves—in its various forms. And the materials we fill the rock with also move, change with time. Heat and gases are emitted from decaying radioisotopes, moisture accumulates, and canisters corrode. The systems ecologists were right about one thing: Nature is dynamic, and high-level radioactive waste won't disappear. Eventually, it will he recycled back into the "system." It will accumulate in animals and humans down the food chain. If industry and the military continue to produce radioactive elements such as plutonium, they will become lively agents in a new kind of system that includes the transuranic elements, if not those who unleashed them. What the systems theorists mistook was the extent to which humans could control the system. Control in the cybernetic sense is different from "working with." It is analogous to the human control of other humans as governors of slaves. Eventually, the slaves revolt, become free radicals. If we can learn anything from the Indian perspective in this region it is that we need to afford all things some degree of subjectivity. Even when today's scientists well understand the limits of "objectivity," Euroamerican culture—including scientists—continue to proceed as though humans live outside the world they attempt to manipulate and control. Control is not all bad. But the belief in the right to control an objectified Other is dangerously illusory. The experiment at Yucca Mountain, and the history of that region show the illusion (indeed, the fantasy) of control for what it is. Much like the "Sorcerer's Apprentice" of the Disney cartoon, the product of our meddling with forces we don't entirely understand escapes our control—multiplying and taking on a life of its own.

#### The aff’s myopic focus technical solutions to climate change trades off with other environmental concerns—only alt can solve the root cause

Crist 7

[Eileen, Associate Professor of Science and Technology Studies in the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies at Virginia Tech, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse” Telos 141 Winter 2007] // myost

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### The AFF's attempt to unify nature around a “sustainable” solution to ecological catastrophe fantasises the existence of a singular, harmonious Nature, rather than coming to terms with the facticity of multiple, contingent Natures. This presupposition mandates the imagining of ecological Armageddon as a tactic to stave off a more vital project of reimagining our relationship to the Earth.

Swyngedouw 6

[Erik Swyngedouw, University of Manchester. “Impossible 'Sustainability' and the Post-Political Condition.” 2006. Also published in *The Sustainable Development Paradox: Urban Political Economy in the United States and Europe*. Eds. Rob J. Krueger and David Gibbs. New York: The Guilford Press, 2007. <[www.liv.ac.uk/geography/seminars/Sustainabilitypaper.doc](http://www.liv.ac.uk/geography/seminars/Sustainabilitypaper.doc)>.] // myost

Slavoj Žižek suggests in Looking Awry that the current ecological crisis is indeed a radical condition that not only constitutes a real and present danger, but, equally importantly, “questions our most unquestionable presuppositions, the very horizon of our meaning, our everyday understanding of ‘nature’ as a regular, rhythmic process” (Zizek, (1992) 2002: 34). It raises serious questions about what were long considered self-evident certainties. He argues that this fundamental threat to our deepest convictions of what we always thought we knew for certain about nature is co-constitutive of our general unwillingness to take the ecological crisis completely serious. It is this destabilising effect that explains “the fact that the typical, predominant reaction to it still consists in a variation of the famous disavowal, “I know very well (that things are deadly serious, that what is at stake is our very survival), but just the same I don’t really believe, … and that is why I continue to act as if ecology is of no lasting consequence for my everyday life” (page 35). The same unwillingness to question our very assumptions about what nature is (and even more so what natures might ‘become’) also leads to the typical obsessive reactions of those who DO take the ecological crisis seriously. Žižek considers both the case of the environmental activist, who in his or her relentless and obsessive activism to achieve a transformation of society in more ecologically sustainable ways expresses a fear that to stop acting would lead to catastrophic consequences. In his words, obsessive acting becomes a tactic to stave off the ultimate catastrophe, i.e. “if I stop doing what I am doing, the world will come to an end in an ecological Armageddon”. Others, of course, see all manner of transcendental signs in the ‘revenge of nature’, read it as a message that signals our destructive intervention in nature and urge us to change our relationship with nature. In other words, we have to listen to nature’s call, as expressed by the pending environmental catastrophe, and respond to its message that pleas for a more benign, associational relation with nature, a post-human affective connectivity, as a cosmopolitical “partner in dialogue”. While the first attitude radically ignores the reality of possible ecological disaster, the other two, which are usually associated with actors defending ‘sustainable’ solutions for our current predicament, are equally problematic in that they both ignore, or are blind to the inseparable gap between our symbolic representation (our understanding) of Nature and the actual acting of a wide range of radically different and, often contingent, natures. In other words, there is – of necessity – an unbridgeable gap, a void, between our dominant view of Nature (as a predictable and determined set of processes that tends towards a (dynamic) equilibrium – but one that is disturbed by our human actions and can be ‘rectified’ with proper sustainable practices) and the acting of natures as an (often) unpredictable, differentiated, incoherent, open-ended, complex, chaotic (although by no means unordered or un-patterned) set of processes. The latter implies the existence not only of many natures, but, more importantly, it also assumes the possibility of all sorts of possible future natures, all manner of imaginable different human-non human assemblages and articulations, and all kinds of different possible socio-environmental becomings. The inability to take ‘natures’ seriously is dramatically illustrated by the controversy over the degree to which disturbing environmental change is actually taking place and the risks or dangers associated with it. Lomborg’s The Sceptical Environmentalist captures one side of this controversy in all its phantasmagorical perversity (Lomborg, 1998), while climate change doomsday pundits represent the other. Both sides of the debate argue from an imaginary position of the presumed existence of a dynamic balance and equilibrium, the point of ‘good’ nature, but one side claims that the world is veering off the correct path, while the other side (Lomborg and other sceptics) argues that we are still pretty much on nature’s course. With our gaze firmly fixed on capturing an imaginary ‘idealised’ Nature, the controversy further solidifies our conviction of the possibility of a harmonious, balanced, and fundamentally benign ONE Nature if we would just get our interaction with it right, an argument blindly (and stubbornly) fixed on the question of where Nature’s rightful point of benign existence resides. This futile debate, circling around an assumedly centred, known, and singular Nature, certainly permits -- in fact invites -- imagining ecological catastrophe at some distant point (global burning (or freezing) through climate change, resource depletion, death by overpopulation). Indeed, imagining catastrophe and fantasising about the final ecological Armageddon seems considerably easier for most environmentalists than envisaging relatively small changes in the socio-political and cultural-economic organisation of local and global life here and now. Or put differently, the world’s premature ending in a climatic Armageddon seems easier to imagine (and sell to the public) than a transformation of (or end to) the neo-liberal capitalist order that keeps on practicing expanding energy use and widening and deepening its ecological footprint. It is this sort of considerations that led Slavoj Žižek controversially to state that “nature does not exist”. Of course, he does not imply that there are no such ‘things’ as quarks or other subatomic particles, black holes, tsunamis, sunshine, trees, or HIV viruses. Even less would he decry the radical effects of CO2 and other greenhouse gases on the climate or the lethal consequences of water contamination for the world’s poor. On the contrary, they are very real, many posing serious environmental problems, occasionally threatening entire populations (AIDS, for example), but he insists that the Nature we see and work with is necessarily radically imagined, scripted, symbolically charged; and is radically distant from the natures that are there, which are complex, chaotic, often unpredictable, often radically contingent, risky, patterned in endlessly complex ways, ordered along ‘strange’ attractors. In other words, there is no balanced, dynamic equilibrium based nature out there that needs or requires salvation in name of either Nature itself or of an equally imagined universal human survival. ‘Nature’ simply does not exist. There is nothing foundational in nature that needs, demands, or requires sustaining. The debate and controversies over nature and what do with it, in contrast, signals rather our political inability to engage in directly political and social argument and strategies about re-arranging the social co-ordinates of everyday life and the arrangements of socio-metabolic organisation (something usually called capitalism) that we inhabit. In order words, imagining a benign and ‘sustainable’ Nature avoids asking the politically sensitive, but vital, question as to what kind of socio-environmental arrangements do we wish to produce, how can this be achieved, and what sort of natures do we wish to inhabit.

#### Reject their fear-based framing of climate change—even if their science is true—they can’t apply it to the SOCIAL realm of politics

Hulme 8

[Mike, School of Environmental Science, UEA, Norwich and Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research, UK, “The conquering of climate: discourses of fear and their dissolution,” *The Geographical Journal* 174.1 (Mar 2008): 5-16.] // myost

By the mid-to-late 1980s, however, the dominant scientific opinion had settled firmly on the prognosis of future warming 2 (e.g. Bolin et al. 1986), and the emergence of anthropogenic global climate change as a public policy issue around this time induced a heightening of anxiety. Weingart et al. (2000) showed that the term ‘climate catastrophe’ first appeared in the German language in the cultural magazine Der Spiegel in April 1986 and they trace the subsequent emergence of this discourse of impending climatic disaster. Following the ‘greenhouse summer of 1988’ in the USA (Ungar 1992) and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, fears of Cold War destruction were displaced around the turn of the decade by those associated with climate change: ‘apocalyptic fears about widespread droughts and melting ice caps have displaced the nuclear threat as the dominant feared meteorological disaster’ (Ross 1991, 8). Further, the association of global danger with anthropogenic climate warming was eventually institutionalised in Article 2 of the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change: ‘the ultimate objective of this convention is to stabilise concentrations of greenhouse gases at concentrations which would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system’. Shorter-term cycles of heightened concern and anxiety about anthropogenic climate change have followed over the last 15 years, many of them linked directly new scientific assessments or to major political negotiating set pieces (e.g. Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). Yet the language and metaphorical constructions of fear and catastrophe shaping this discourse have been embellished substantially in the years following 9/11. The ‘war on terror’ provided a new benchmark against which the dangers of future climate change could be referenced, whilst new linguistic and metaphorical repertoires have been enabled 3 : ‘The alarmist repertoire uses an inflated language, with terms such as ‘catastrophe chaos and havoc, and its tone is often urgent. It employs a quasi-religious register of doom, death, judgements, heaven and hell. It also uses language of acceleration, increase, intractaibiltiy, irreversibility and momentum’ (Retallack et al. 2007, 55). These following examples are indicative: The impacts of global warming are such that I have no hesitation in describing it as a ‘weapon of mass destruction’. Sir John Houghton, The Guardian (28 July 2003) In my view, climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing today – more serious even than the threat of terrorism. Sir David King, Science (9 January 2004) Billions of us will die [from climate change] and the few breeding pairs of people that survive will be in the Arctic where the climate remains tolerable by the end of the twenty-first century. James Lovelock, The Independent (16 January 2006) Terror only kills hundreds or thousands of people. Global warming could kill millions. We should have a war on global warming rather than the war on terror. Stephen Hawking, quoted in The Times (31 January 2007, 3) At the same time, enhanced Earth system modelling capabilities have opened up new scenarios of the climatic future, simulating our alleged impending approach to triggering major re-organisations of large-scale functions of the Earth system. The melting of the Greenland Ice Sheet, the massive release of methane hydrates in the tundra, or a redirection of the thermo-haline circulation of the world’s ocean (and attendant changes in the ‘Gulf Stream’) 4 are three of the more significant ones. These prospective futures, given virtual reality through computer modelling, have been grouped together and communicated to an expectant world using Malcolm Gladwell’s ‘tipping point’ metaphor, further nourishing the discourse of global climate catastrophe. Not only does this discourse find saliency in the media (witness examples above), but also through a new cohort of popular science books – for example, Fred Pearce’s (2007) book With speed and violence: why scientists fear tipping points in climate change , or Mayer Hillman and colleagues’ (2007) The suicidal planet: how to prevent global climate catastrophe – and in the more formal academic literature (e.g. Ereaut and Segnit 2006; Hansen et al. 2007; Risbey 2008). Dissolving climate catastrophe If the two previous discourses of fear examined here were founded upon unknown causes and unknown places, this contemporary discourse of fear surrounding climate is founded upon the unknown future. The pre-modern and modern fears associated with climate were (largely) conquered, respectively, through rationalisation of the causes of weather extremes and through acclimatisation to tropical climates. Unknown causes became known; unknown places were made safe. These conquerings of climate were not complete – echoes of both of these fears still linger in different cultural forms today – yet they occurred as a by-product of much wider cultural changes involving religion, science, politics and technology. This naturally poses the question: how will the contemporary discourse of fear about future climate change be conquered, or are we destined to remain living perpetually under the shadow of climate catastrophe? How can we conquer our post-modern fear of the unknown climatic future? Conquering climate through mastery A number of prospective routes for conquering climatic change are conventionally held out to us, all of them variants on the idea of ‘engineering’ – geo-engineering, political engineering and social engineering – and all of them with connotations of global control and mastery of the climatic future. 5 The idea of large-scale deliberate intervention in the functioning of the Earth’s climate system to engineer a desirable climate outcome has a long history which is well explored in Fleming (2006a). He identifies three cycles of promise and hype – of seeking mastery over the climate – starting in the nineteenth century and culminating in the ideas of geo-engineering our way out of global warming mooted in recent years (e.g. Morton 2007). Various schemes have been proposed – for example fertilising the southern oceans to enhance carbon uptake, deflector mirrors in orbit around the Earth, aerosol emissions into the stratosphere – and some have even been evaluated formally inside climate models (e.g. Crutzen 2007). All of these schemes carry an element of hubris and: by emphasising the purely technical or economic aspects of strategies of weather and climate control, bypassing understanding and prediction and neglecting the human dimensions . . . we are in danger of entering a new cycle of discourse saturated with hype, the heirs of an impoverished debate. Fleming (2006a, 15) A second variant of the engineering route out of the discourse of catastrophe involves a systematic attempt to align the institutions of international science, environmental management, governance and diplomacy to find rational alliances of interest which can deliver a global climate regime – what we might call ‘geopolitical engineering’. This brings together the insights of Earth system scientists and technologists (e.g. the vision outlined by Hall and O’Connell 2007) with those of political scientists and economists to yield a system which Frank Biermann has labelled ‘Earth system governance’ (Biermann 2007). This vision (implicitly) underpins the structure of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the subsequent Kyoto Protocol, the Stern Review and the new round of international negotiations and diplomacy seeking a new post-2012 global climate change settlement. The framing of climate change as a problem of ‘climate stabilisation’ is an outcome of this way of thinking (as traced by Boykoff et al. 2008; also Oels 2005). A successful outcome to this governance project demands a degree of optimism unfounded on the evidence of progress achieved to date. If geopolitical engineering is a top-down route for averting climate catastrophe, then it is perhaps complemented by a third engineering route, namely the purposeful manipulation of lifestyles and consumption habits – bottom-up ‘social engineering’. Social marketing campaigns (e.g. by Defra in the UK; see Linder 2006) are attempts to change individual behaviour and social consumption habits in favour of lower carbon emissions. The call for mass participation in global events, such as Live Earth (July 2007), is further demonstration of a desire to achieve climatic goals through social engineering. Social movements, such as the international Cities for Climate Protection campaign (Slocum 2004) and the Stop Climate Chaos campaign in the UK, are also part of these purposeful attempts to defuse climate catastrophe, as is Paul Hawken’s book Blessed unrest (2007). The limits to this type of mass social engineering, however, are revealed through work in social and behavioural psychology (see Baron 2006; Weber 2006). Reading climate change through culture These three caricatures of ‘engineering’ approaches for defusing the discourse of climate catastrophe – geo-engineering, geopolitical engineering, social engineering – all bear the language of control and mastery over climate. This mastery is exercised over, respectively, the planet directly, the institutions of governance or the choices and behaviour of individuals. These approaches suggest that climate is an objective reality to be manipulated through material intervention. They imply an unambiguous separation between Nature and culture. Taken at face value these projects all echo the hubris of Ellsworth Huntington from 1915: ‘If we can conquer climate, the whole world will become stronger and nobler’ (1915/2001, 294). It seems unlikely that any of these global mega-engineering projects will offer the salvation that is sought (Fleming 2006b). An alternative way to appreciate our fears about the climatic future, and hence to suggest an unengineered route out of these fears, is to read climate through culture (e.g. O’Riordan and Jordan 1999; Golinksi 2007). The fear of unknown climatic causes was dissolved through Enlightenment rationality and the fear of unknown climatic places was dissolved through the collapse of the Imperial project. If we can read our contemporary discourse of climate catastrophe as embedded in, and shaped by, contemporary culture, might we thus offer the prospect of re-situating these fears about the climatic future as cultures change? It is perhaps in this direction that Steve Yearley is pointing when he distinguishes between the ‘substantivist’ position on environmental risks and those who take a symbolic reading of them (Yearley 2006). The former position would see the fears associated with prospective climate change as material and dominant, whereas the latter would place these fears as symbolic and recessive, situated in a psychological deficit, as we see our intuitive sense of Nature – in this case our sense of natural climate – dissembled. For Yearley, ‘we need to read the cultural message [of climate change] for its underlying content’ (2006, 14). Two such cultural readings most immediately present themselves. Andrew Ross (1991) was one of the first commentators to put global warming into the context of the globalising tendencies of the post-1980s, tendencies which have recently been caricatured as the ‘creative destruction’ of neo-liberalism by Harvey (2006). We noted earlier the significance of the collapse of Communism in 1989 for the emergence of the discourse of climate catastrophe – fears were transferred from nuclear apocalypse to climate apocalypse – but Ross extends his analysis further by suggesting that the very construction of the idea of a ‘global climate’ in the 1980s, one that could be measured and monitored, was contingent upon the wider globalisation movement. ‘Instead of feeling the weather as we have felt it historically, as part of a shared local, or even national culture, we are encouraged to think of it globally’ (Ross 1991, 25). This interconnectedness between globalisation, ideology and the global environment has also been explored by Dalby (2007), and for him the discourse of global climate catastrophe cannot be understood outside this particular geopolitical and cultural setting. A second cultural reading of contemporary climate change would use the idea of ecological modernisation as introduced by Hajer (1995). For Hajer, anthropogenic global climate change is an emblematic example of a phenomenon constructed through the interaction of three trends – a material change in environmental conditions, a heightened ecological consciousness affecting public values, and the growing institutional managerialism of capitalist economies. For Hajer – as for later commentators from science and technology studies (e.g. Millstone 2005; Oels 2005; Demeritt 2006) – an emerging discourse of climate catastrophe reveals more about the struggle for ascendancy between the institutions of science, government, business and civil society than it does about a physical reality waiting to strike. The contemporary discourse of climate catastrophe may also be tapping into a deeper and nonnegotiable human anxiety about the future, an anxiety which is merely attaching itself at the current time to the portended climates of the future – future climates offered up to society by the predictive claims of science. Science has never before offered such putative knowledge of the far future, complete with uncertainty ranges, tipping points and probabilities, and so our fragile and nervous human psyche has latched onto such pronouncements with vigour. ‘Today our expertise and our worries turn towards the weather because our industrious know-how is acting, perhaps catastrophically, on global nature’ (Serres 1995, 27). Climate change provides a conduit, a lightening rod, for materialising our immaterial angst. Yearley (2006) explores these ‘phenomenology of nature’ worries as exemplified in Bill McKibbin’s classic book The end of nature (McKibbin 1989), and as more recently articulated in Jules Pretty’s series of essays The Earth only endures (Pretty 2007). Conclusion Whichever ways our fears of the climatic future have emerged from the wider cultural settings and trends of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries – and all of the above cultural readings of climate change are in need of further exploration (see Hulme 2008) – it is the argument of this essay that it is only through further cultural change, working on and through material processes, that the contemporary discourse of climatic catastrophe will be dissolved. As the naturalistic causal turn of the nineteenth century dissolved the fear of climate rooted in unknown causes and the technology and hyper-mobility of the twentieth century weakened and defused the fear of unknown climatic spaces, so we will find new cultural movements and new hierarchies of power changing the discourse of fear about unknown climatic futures. Our relationship with climate will change again, whilst attempts at engineering the climate of the future, at conquering climate through mastery of the material world, will yield but minor successes. As Boia (2005) implies, the battles over climate change occur as much in the cultural and individual imagination as in the atmospheric spaces in which physical climates are formed. So there are other possible cultural readings of climate change, poorly explored in the research literature, which do not connote with fear of catastrophe. Climate change and the unknown future look very different when seen, for example, through the cultural eyes of dryland pastoralists in Africa, South Pacific islanders or the Canadian Inuit (see Strauss and Orlove 2003); climatic catastrophe may not feature within these frames. And the ideas about the domestication of nature explored by Kareiva et al. (2007) offer another way of reading our relationship with climate, a reading which recognises climate as a hybrid entity emerging inescapably from the reflexive shaping of Nature and culture. New ideas, ideologies and powers will emerge and shape new discourses of climate, discourses located in the new dominant cultural movements of the future. Alignments between ideologies, technologies and cultural movements can change more rapidly than can the physical climate (Ungar 1992; Dalby 2007). There is a future beyond ecological modernisation. Globalism, neoliberalism and the ‘war on terror’ will not be with us for ever. Neither may climate catastrophe, at least in its current constructed form. As Terry Eagleton bluntly puts it: It is the hard-nosed pragmatists who behave as though the World Bank and caffe latte will be with us for the next two millennia who are the real dreamers, and those who are open to the as yet unfigurable future who are the true realist. Terry Eagleton (13 June 2005) Through all of this, humanity will retain its precarious and ambiguous relationships with climate, relationships which have a long history and an unknown future. The prediction of future climates will remain tantalisingly out of our grasp, just as the prediction of the path of human cultural development on this planet will remain elusive. Rather than seeking to conquer climate, we should be aiming to celebrate climate and respect it as part of ourselves.

#### The AFF’s ontology reduces the world to “Standing Reserve” to be called upon as it benefits the Self and refuses to value the world as anything else. This renders all beings objects—setting the tone for global warfare.

Zimmerman 81

[Michael E. Zimmerman, Tulane University. *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity*. 220-224.] // myost

In 1951 Heidegger noted that Spengler's idea of the "decline of the West" is "only the negative, though correct, consequence of Nietzsche's word, 'the wasteland grows'." (WHO, 14/38) Spengler's estimation is negative because it only describes the symptoms of decay, not the origins. Recalling the destruction caused by World War II, Heidegger asserted that the present spiritual devastation is more uncanny than physical destruction. "The devastation of the earth can easily go hand in hand with a guaranteed supreme living standard for [humans], and just as easily with the organized establishment of a uniform state of happiness for all [humanity]." (WHO, 11/29-30) He denied that he was part of the "chorus of voices" which condemned the "sickness" of Europe. While some writers took the easy road of describing the absurdity of modern life, Heidegger sought to discover the source of this absurdity. This source turns out to be: our destiny to understand ourselves as absolute subjects in a universe of commodities. Life in such a world cannot help but be absurd or, to use Heidegger's early terminology, inauthentic. Although technological culture is supposedly our destiny, Heidegger is not pleased with its traits—the self-sustaining, constantly expanding, and ultimately aimless systems of mass production and consumption; power politics; global warfare; mass-culture; and the collapse of great art, literature, philosophy, and religion. Already in "The Age of the World Picture" (1938), he writes that once the world becomes a mere picture (Bild) for the human subject, men contend for the "right" to organize the picture as it suits them. There arises the struggle of "world views," for whose sake "man brings into play his unlimited power for the calculating, planning, and molding of all things. Science as research is an absolutely necessary form of this establishing of self in the world...." (Hw, 87/135) Each competing world-view declares that its system of values best promotes human life; that is, the life of the people of the nation promoting the particular world-view. Values become nothing more than the "objectification of needs as goals." (Hw, 94/142) Refusing to acknowledge anything transcendent, nation-states try to dominate each other in their quest for markets, raw material, and "Lebensraum." Anything which enhances the power of the state, including the politicalization of education, art, religion, and science, is justified. (Nil, 28, 362-363) Production and consumption are, of course, organized as part of the push for total power. In a public lecture in 1939, Heidegger said that people expect that this drive for power necessarily establishes life-enhancing values, as if total mobilization were something in itself and not the organization of unconditioned senselessness for and from the Will to Power. Such power-empowering positings no longer direct themselves according to "masses" and "ideals," which could still be grounded in themselves; they stand "In the service" of the pure expansion of power and are evaluated only according to the thus esteemed economic value. The age of fulfilled senselessness is thus the time of the power-like discovery and accomplishment of "world-views," which drive all reckoning of re-presenting and re-producing [Vor- and Herstellens] to the uttermost extreme, because according to their essence they arise from a self-posited self-directing of mankind into beings and its [humankind's] unconditioned domination over all means of power of the earth and over [the earth] itself. (Nil, 21-22) The analysis of the clash of world-views was directed primarily against Germany under National Socialism, but against other Western nations as well. This is evident in a comment Heidegger made in 1940 concerning how one nation "justifies" all actions, so long as they promote greater power: "For example, if the English thoroughly blast the French fleet anchored in the harbor of Oran, this is from their power-standpoint wholly 'justified' [gerecht]; for 'justified' means only: what is useful for power-enhancement." (Nil, 198) This remarkable statement anticipated by almost two years the Japanese attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. The statement was made around the time Hitler ordered the invasion of Poland for reasons of "national security." When Heidegger said in 1951 that World War II "decided nothing" (WHO, 65/166), he did not mean that it was unimportant for Hitler to have been defeated. His point was that world wars arc only offshoots of the industrialization and "planetary imperialism" (Hw, 102/152-153) which are the key symptoms of the modem age. In a marginal note found in his own copy of his "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger wrote: "Industrial society as the authoritative subject-and thinking as 'politics'."13 World wars are ways of shoring up faltering economies; wars provide "the stability of a constant form of using things up." Leaders of power-hungry nations are not merely individuals caught up in the "blind rage of a selfish egoism," but are instruments of world-destiny. (VA, I, 84-85/104-105) Everything is planned for the sake of accelerating the process of production and consumption, as Ernst Jiinger pointed out in the 1920s.14 The push for power will finally lead to attempts to "breed" human beings in factories, because humans are the most important raw material. The increase in the number of masses of human beings is done explicitly by plan so that the opportunity will never run out for claiming more "room to live" for the large masses whose size then requires correspondingly higher masses of human beings for their arrangement. This circularity of consumption for the sake of consumption is the sole procedure which distinctively characterizes the history of a world which has become an unworld. (VA, I, 88/107) The Will to Power manifests itself primarily, therefore, in economic terms. Self-willed man turns everything into a commodity. [Man] himself, along with everything else, is turned into a "calculated market value" of a world-wide market. (Hw, 270/114-115) Heidegger was aware of the international corporations which ignore national boundaries in the search for cheaper material, labor, and new markets.15 In the world run by corporate interests, everyday life becomes the effort to succeed in the marketplace. (Hw, 290/136) Heidegger sounds like Marx in saying: Self-willed man reckons everywhere with things and men as with objects. What is so reckoned becomes merchandise. Everything is constantly changed about into new orders.... Self-assertive man lives by staking his will. He lives essentially by risking his essence [Wesen] in the vibration of money and the currency [Geltens] of values. As the constant trader and middleman, man is the "merchant." He weighs and measures constantly, yet does not know the real weight of things. He also does not know what in himself has authentic weight [Gewicht] and prevails [iiberwiegt]. (Hw, 289/135) Everyday life is determined according to the demands of the economic system. In this hectic world, we no longer understand death, pain, or love. (Hw, 253/96) We are uprooted and alienated; great masses move across continents in search of "better opportunities," "personal improvement," and a "higher standard of living"; the self disappears in the process of production (ZSF, 74/75); rivers and streams become sewers; the air is poisoned; forests are annihilated; mountains are flattened for their ore, or to make room for highways; farms become "agri-business" operations which degrade the soil with the imposition of artificial fertilizers and pesticides; homes become high-rise apartment complexes; work becomes repetitive, simplified, and boring; biochemists study how to manipulate man's genetic structure; and all of this happens under the aegis of self-development, self-emancipation, and progress. No human action can bring about a change in the technological impulse, for "Self-assertive [human]...is the functionary of Technik." (Hw, 271/116)16 The momentum of the technological Will to Power has outstripped [humanity's] capacity to control it. (G, 19/51) Before World War II, Heidegger speculated that "Before Being can occur in its primal truth, Being as the will must be broken, the world must be forced to collapse and the earth must be driven to desolation, and [human] to mere labor." (VI, I, 65/86) But even the devastation of the wars did not essentially change the situation in the modern world. Human life in the technological age bears important similarities to what Heidegger called "inauthentic everydayness" in Being and Time. There he suggested that inauthenticity resulted when an individual chose to conceal the truth. In his later work, he argues that inauthenticity reigns because humanity has become the self-certain subject who yearns to dominate everything. Heidegger personifies the subject, talking as if it were a conscious agent manipulating individuals to act according to its dictates. He makes individuals appear to be functions of the subject in a way analogous to how Marx makes them appear to be functions of "Lord Capital." In Capital, we read: As the conscious bearer of this movement [of capital], the possessor of money becomes a capitalist. His person, or rather his pocket, is the point from which the money starts, and to which it returns. The objective content of the circulation we have been discussing—the valorization of value—is his subjective purpose, and it is only insofar as the appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force behind his operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e., as capital personified and endowed with consciousness and will. Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit of any single transaction. This boundless drive for enrichment, this passionate chase after value, is common to the capitalist and the miser, but while the miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist is a rational miser.

#### The alternative is to do nothing. This isn't a question of passivity but of a releasement from the Will to Technology and an openness to the mystery of Being which transcends activity. Only such an ontological disarmament inaugurates new modes of revealing that don't depend on the world's subordination to human motivations.

McWhorter 92

[Ladelle McWhorter, University of Richmond. *Heidegger and the Earth: Issues in Environmental Philosophy*. Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 1992. 3-7.] // myost

Heidegger's work is a call to reflect to think in some way other than calculatively, technologically, pragmatically. Once we begin to move with and into Heidegger's call, and begin to see our trying to seize control and solve problems as itself a problematic approach if we still believe that thinking's only real purpose is to function as a prelude to action, we who attempt to think will twist within the agonizing grip of paradox, feeling nothing but frustration, unable to conceive of ourselves as anything but paralyzed. However, as so many peoples before us have known, paradox is not only a trap; it is also a scattering point and passageway. Paradox invites examination of its own constitution (hence of the patterns of thinking within which it occurs) and thereby breaks a way of thinking open, revealing the configurations of power that propel it and hold it on track. And thus it makes possible the dissipation of that power and the deflection of thinking into new paths and new possibilities. Heidegger frustrates us. At a time when the stakes are so very high and decisive action is so loudly and urgently called for, Heidegger apparently calls us to do – nothing. If we get beyond the revulsion and anger that such a call initially inspires and actually examine the feasibility of response, we begin to undergo the frustration attendant upon paradox: how is it possible, we ask, to choose, to will, to do nothing? The call itself places in question the bimodal logic of activity and passivity; it points up the paradoxical nature of our passion for action, of our passion for maintaining control. The call itself suggests that our drive for acting decisively and forcefully is part of what must be thought through, that the narrow option of will versus surrender is one of the power configurations of current thinking that must be allowed to dissipate. But of course, those drives and those conceptual dichotomies are part of the very structure of our self-understanding both as individuals and as a tradition and a civilization. Hence, Heidegger's call is a threatening one, requiring great courage, "the courage to make the truth of our own presuppositions and the realm of our own goals into the things that most deserve to be called in question."3 Heidegger's work pushes thinking to think through the assumptions that underlie both our ecological vandalism and our love of scientific solutions, assumptions that also ground the most basic patterns of our current ways of being human. What is most illustrative is often also what is most common. Today, on all sides of ecological debate we hear, with greater and greater frequency, the word management. On the one hand, business people want to manage natural resources so as to keep up profits. On the other hand, conservationists want to manage natural resources so that there will be plenty of coal and oil and recreational facilities for future generations. These groups and factions within them debate vociferously over which management policies are the best, that is, the most efficient and manageable. Radical environmentalists damn both groups and claim it is human population growth and rising expectations that are in need of management. But wherever we look, wherever we listen, we see and hear the term management. We are living in a veritable age of management. Before a middle class child graduates from high school she or he is already preliminarily trained in the arts of weight management, stress management, and time management, to name just a few. As we approach middle age we continue to practice these essential arts, refining and adapting our regulatory regimes as the pressures of life increase and the body begins to break down. We have become a society of managers - of our homes, careers, portfolios, estates, even of our own bodies - so is it surprising that we set ourselves up as the managers of the earth itself? And yet, as thoughtful earth-dwellers we must ask, what does this signify? In numerous essays - in particular the beautiful 1953 essay, "The Question Concerning Technology" - Heidegger speaks of what he sees as the danger of dangers in this, our, age. This danger is a kind of forgetfulness - a forgetfulness that Heidegger thought could result not only in nuclear disaster or environmental catastrophe, but in the loss of what makes us the kind of beings we are, beings who can think and who can stand in thoughtful relationship to things. This forgetfulness is not a forgetting of facts and their relationships; it is a forgetfulness of something far more important and far more fundamental than that. He called it forgetfulness of 'the mystery’. It would be easy to imagine that by 'the mystery' Heidegger means some sort of entity, some thing, temporarily hidden or permanently ineffable. But 'the mystery’ is not the name of some thing; it is the event of the occurring together of revealing and concealing. Every academic discipline, whether it be biology or history, anthropology or mathematics, is interested in discovery, in the revelation of new truths. Knowledge, at least as it is institutionalized in the modern world, is concerned, then, with what Heidegger would call revealing, the bringing to light, or the coming to presence of things. However, in order for any of this revealing to occur, Heidegger says, concealing must also occur. Revealing and concealing belong together. Now, what does this mean? We know that in order to pay attention to one thing, we must stop paying close attention to something else. In order to read philosophy we must stop reading cereal boxes. In order to attend to the needs of students we must sacrifice some of our research time. Allowing for one thing to reveal itself means allowing for the concealing of something else. All revealing comes at the price of concomitant concealment. But this is more than just a kind of Kantian acknowledgment of human limitation. Heidegger is not simply dressing up the obvious, that is, the fact that no individual can undergo two different experiences simultaneously. His is not a point about human subjectivity at all. Rather, it is a point about revealing itself. When revealing reveals itself as temporally linear and causally ordered, for example, it cannot simultaneously reveal itself as ordered by song and unfolding in dream. Furthermore, in revealing, revealing itself is concealed in order for what is revealed to come forth. Thus, when revealing occurs concealing occurs as well. The two events are one and cannot be separated.4 Too often we forget. The radiance of revelation blinds us both to its own event and to the shadows that it casts, so that revealing conceals itself and its self-concealing conceals itself, and we fall prey to that strange power of vision to consign to oblivion whatever cannot be seen. Even our forgetting is forgotten, and all traces of absence absent themselves from our world. The noted physicist Stephen Hawking, in his popular book A Brief History of Time, writes, "The eventual goal of science is to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe."5 Such a theory, many people would assert, would be a systematic arrangement of all knowledge both already acquired and theoretically possible. It would be a theory to end all theories, outside of which no information, no revelation could, or would need to, occur. And the advent of such a theory would be as the shining of a light into every corner of being. Nothing would remain concealed. This dream of Hawking's is a dream of power; in fact, it is a dream of absolute power, absolute control. It is a dream of the ultimate managerial Utopia. This, Heidegger would contend, is the dream of technological thought in the modern age. We dream of knowing, grasping everything, for then we can control, then we can manage, everything. But it is only a dream, itself predicated, ironically enough, upon concealment, the self-concealing of the mystery. We can never control-the mystery the belonging together of revealing and concealing. In order to approach the world in a manner exclusively technological, calculative, mathematical, scientific, we must already have given up (or lost, or been expelled by, or perhaps ways of being such as we are even impossible within) other approaches or modes of revealing that would unfold into knowledges of other sorts. Those other approaches or paths of thinking must already have been obliterated; those other knowledges must already have concealed themselves in order for technological or scientific revelation to occur. The danger of a managerial approach to the world lies not, then, in what it knows - not in its penetration into the secrets of galactic emergence or nuclear fission - but in what it forgets, what it itself conceals. It forgets that any other truths are possible, and it forgets that the belonging together of revealing with concealing is forever beyond the power of human management. We can never have, or know, it all; we can never manage everything. What is now especially dangerous about this sense of our own managerial power, born of forgetfulness, is that it results in our viewing the world as mere resources to be stored or consumed. Managerial or technological thinkers, Heidegger says, view the earth, the world, all things as mere Bestand, standing-reserve. All is here simply for human use. No plant, no animal, no ecosystem has a life of its own, has any significance, apart from human desire and need. Nothing, we say, other than human beings, has any intrinsic value. All things are instruments for the working out of human will. Whether we believe that God gave Man dominion or simply that human might (sometimes called intelligence or rationality) in the face of ecological fragility makes us always right, we managerial, technological thinkers tend to believe that the earth is only a stockpile or a set of commodities to be managed, bought, and sold. The forest is timber; the river, a power source. Even people have become resources, human resources, personnel to be managed, or populations to be controlled. This managerial, technological mode of revealing, Heidegger says, is embedded in and constitutive of Western culture and has been gathering strength for centuries. Now it is well on its way to extinguishing all other modes of revealing, all other ways of being human and being earth. It will take tremendous effort to think through this danger, to think past it and beyond, tremendous courage and resolve to allow thought of the mystery to come forth; thought of the inevitability, along with revealing, of concealment, of loss, of ignorance; thought of the occurring of things and their passage as events not ultimately under human control. And of course even the call to allow this thinking - couched as it so often must be in a grammatical imperative appealing to an agent - is itself a paradox, the first that must be faced and allowed to speak to us and to shatter us as it scatters thinking in new directions, directions of which we have not yet dreamed, directions of which we may never dream. And shattered we may be, for our self-understanding is at stake; in fact, our very selves - selves engineered by the technologies of power that shaped, that are, modernity - are at stake. Any thinking that threatens the notion of human being as modernity has posited it - as rationally self-interested individual, as self-possessed bearer of rights and obligations, as active mental and moral agent - is thinking that threatens our very being, the configurations of subjective existence in our age.

### CP

#### The United States federal government should remove state restrictions on local solar siting.

#### Removing the restrictions allows for local solar power—solves warming

Pursley and Wiseman 11 [Garrick [Assistant Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law] and Hannah [Assistant Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law]; Local Energy; 60 Emory L.J. 877; kdf)

Our analysis departs from the literature in two important ways. First, most of the cooperative strategies that have been suggested involve federal-state cooperation and suggest ways to enhance state government decision-making authority. n304 This appears to be an intellectual leftover from the now-defunct "dual federalism" account of the American governmental structure as comprising two distinct, sovereign "spheres" of authority, federal and state. n305 Many analysts of intergovernmental relations continue to view the federal structure this way, despite the now nearly complete overlap of state and federal authority on most subjects. n306 We instead emphasize the importance of federal-local cooperation and argue that state authority regarding land-energy rules is detrimental to the goal of fostering distributed renewables.¶ Second, the classic "policy laboratories" argument for empowering subnational governments typically trumpets the potential for regulatory pluralism to generate, through trial and error over time, first-best solutions that may then be imposed uniformly from the national level. n307 While we do [\*934] advance a version of the "laboratories" justification to support empowering local governments in the distributed renewables field, we advocate regulatory diversity for certain instrumental reasons other than the possibility of discovering one "correct" or "optimal" national solution. While we think that local variation may be beneficial in raising the profile of distributed renewables issues and sparking debate at the state and national levels, n308 we view diversity primarily as valuable to the goal of fostering broader adoption of distributed renewables, owing to the variety of different kinds of land-energy rules that will be needed to develop these technologies in different locations. Allowing local governments to create various regulatory strategies for the renewables industry to grapple with will also drive innovation in distributed renewables technology, although wholly unconstrained variation will be cumbersome and impede progress. Scholars argue that creating a meaningful role for state and local authority within environmental regulatory structures may enhance those structures' capacity to adapt to changing circumstances n309 and to avoid potentially disastrous regulatory failures. n310 While we do not discuss these important additional benefits at length, our suggestion is consistent with, and supported by, these observations as well as the benefits of local institutional competence, increased opportunity and motivation for energy entrepreneurship, and the potential for faster technological innovation.¶ Our suggestion, then, is that the federal government should first establish some minimum standard - most likely a simple prohibition on state and local regulations that impede renewables siting - for fostering the adoption of distributed renewable energy technologies and should allocate primary [\*935] authority for implementation and regulation, with substantial discretion, to local governments. n311 Since land-energy regulations enabling the use of distributed renewable energy may raise business costs in the short term and may at least appear capable of deterring industrial siting, we contend that a federal minimum standard is necessary to prevent local governments from engaging in races to the bottom. n312 A federal minimum requirement for implementing policies designed to promote the adoption of distributed renewables also should offset the local-level public choice problems that we have mentioned n313 and thereby help to avoid "negative experiments" in which cities empowered with land-energy rule-making authority respond disproportionately to anti-renewables interests and stifle the adoption of distributed renewables. n314¶ In one sense, this is similar to other "federal leadership with subnational government implementation" regimes that are characteristic of environmental federalism. n315 But there is one crucial difference. To truly empower local governments to exercise regulatory authority and discretion in the manner that will be most beneficial, the traditional power of state governments to preempt local government authority must be eliminated in this regulatory context. Perhaps paradoxically, then, establishing a stable regime of decentralized local regulatory authority requires, in addition to a federal minimum standard, federal preemption of state power to interfere with local decision making. Our analysis is context dependent; we do not suggest that this form of federal-local cooperation is optimal in every environmental regulatory context. Our argument is rooted in the particular dynamics of the regulation of distributed renewable energy technology. We first explain our reasons for preferring to lodge primary regulatory authority over distributed renewables with local rather than state governments and then briefly discuss theoretical and doctrinal issues concerning the legality of our proposed cooperative regulatory scheme.

 [\*936]

### Solvency

#### Technology fails – it’s 40 years away

**Day, 8** (Dwayne, “Knights in shining armor,” The Space Review, 6/9,

<http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1147/1>)

The NSSO study is remarkably sensible and even-handed and states that we are nowhere near developing practical SSP and that it is not a viable solution for even the military’s limited requirements. It states that the technology to implement space solar power does not currently exist… and is unlikely to exist for the next forty years. Substantial technology development must occur before it is even feasible. Furthermore, the report makes clear that the key technology requirement is cheap access to space, which no longer seems as achievable as it did three decades ago (perhaps why SSP advocates tend to skip this part of the discussion and hope others solve it for them). The activists have ignored the message and fallen in love with the messenger.

#### Cart before the horse – high launch costs prevent SSP

**Cox, 11** - retired prosecutor and public interest lawyer, author and political activist (William, “The Race for Space Solar Energy,” 3/26,

<http://www.thepeoplesvoice.org/TPV3/Voices.php/2011/03/26/the-race-for-space-solar-energy>

The remaining problem is the expense of lifting equipment and materials into space. The last few flights of the space shuttle this year will cost $20,000 per kilogram of payload to move satellites into orbit and resupply the space station.

It has been estimated that economic viability of space solar energy would require a reduction in the payload cost to less than $200 per kilogram and the total expense, including delivery and assembly in orbit, to less than $3,500 per kilogram.

#### Debris turn—

#### Space debris takes out the satellites

Tadjdeh 2012 (Yasmin; Space Debris on the Rise as Satellite Launches increase; www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/lists/posts/post.aspx?ID=839; kdf)

As the number of satellites being launched into space has grown, so has the amount of dangerous orbital debris circling the globe, a new report found.¶ ¶ The amount of space junk has increased by 7.8 percent since 2010, according to the Space Security Index 2012, a report produced by the Secure World Foundation, a Colorado-based private organization that promotes space sustainability. Meanwhile, 2011 saw the largest deployment of new spacecraft in a decade.¶ ¶ “The total amount of human-created space debris in orbit continues to grow and is concentrated in the high value orbits where space assets are primarily located,” the report said. “In recent years awareness of the space debris problem has grown considerably, in part because various spacecraft have been hit by pieces of debris, intentional debris generating events have occurred, and satellites have collided with one another.”

#### The aff contributes more debris- does more damage

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Space debris can come from rocket booster stages that are released and from pieces of hardware. Collisions often cause considerable space debris fragmentations. While some debris will reenter the Earth’s atmosphere and disintegrate, some will remain in orbit.¶ ¶ Space junk can cause serious problems for satellites and even for structures such as the international space station. Moving at speeds of up to 7.8 kilometers per second, even tiny pieces of space debris can destroy or damage satellites, the report said.

#### Ozone turn—

#### SBSP launches cause a large ozone depletion

**Ross**, M,N, Toohey, D**, 2008,** American Geophysical Union, (http://adsabs.harvard.edu/abs/2008AGUFM.U43A0039R)

**We show that launching the mirrors or sunshade would cause global ozone loss between 2% and 20%. Ozone loss associated with an economically viable SSP system would be at least 0.4% and possibly as large as 3%.** **It is not clear which, if any, of these levels of ozone loss would be acceptable under the Montreal Protocol.** The large uncertainties are mainly caused by a lack of data or validated models regarding liquid propellant rocket engine emissions. **Our results offer four main conclusions. (1) The viability of space-based geoengineering schemes could well be undermined by the relatively large ozone depletion that would be caused by the required rocket launches. (2) Analysis of space- based geoengineering schemes should include the difficult tradeoff between the gain of long-term (~ decades) climate control and the loss of short-term (~ years) deep ozone loss. (3) The trade can be properly evaluated only if our understanding of the stratospheric impact of rocket emissions is significantly improved. (4) Such an improved understanding** **requires a concerted effort of research including new in situ measurements in a variety of rocket plumes and a multi-scale modeling program similar in scope to the effort required to address the climate and ozone impacts of aircraft emissions**.

#### Ozone depletion causes extinction – scientific consensus is on our side.

**Greenpeace, ‘95**

[Full of Holes: Montreal Protocol and the Continuing Destruction of the Ozone Layer, http://archive.greenpeace.org/ozone/holes/holebg.html]

**When chemists** Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molina **first postulated a link between** **c**hloro**f**luoro**c**arbon**s** **and ozone** layer **depletion** in 1974, **the news was greeted with scepticism**, but taken seriously nonetheless. **The vast majority of credible scientists have since confirmed this hypothesis. The ozone layer around the Earth shields us all from harmful** ultraviolet **radiation** from the sun. **Without the ozone layer, life on earth would not exist. Exposure** to increased levels of ultraviolet radiation **can cause** cataracts, skin **cancer**, **and immune system suppression** in humans as well as innumerable effects on other living systems. This is why Rowland's and Molina's theory was taken so seriously, so quickly - **the stakes are literally the continuation of life on earth.**

#### SPS fails—launch infrastructure

Joseph **Rouge** (NSSO director), 10/10/**07.** " Phase 0 Architecture Feasibility Study,” http://science.ksc.nasa.gov/shuttle/nexgen/Nexgen\_Downloads/SBSPInterimAssesment0.1.pdf.

Space Solar Power Satellites are very large structures and require substantially greater lift and in space transportation than has ever previously been attempted. Consequently, they also require a significantly expanded supporting infrastructure. The International Space Station is currently the largest structure in space with a mass of 232 MT, at an orbit of only 333 km. It has the largest solar arrays in space, with a total power of approximately 112 kW. In contrast, a single Space Solar Power Satellite is expected to be above 3,000 MT, several kilometers across, and most likely be located in GEO, at 42,124km, likely delivering between 1 to 10 GWe From the perspective of today’s launch infrastructure, this may seem unimaginably large and ambitious, but in another sense it is well within the relative scale of other human accomplishments which at their time also seemed astounding creations the Eiffel Tower is 8,045 Tons; the Sear’s Tower 222,500 tons; the Empire State Building 365,000 – 392,000 tons, the largest of our supertankers is 650,000MT, and the Great Pyramid at Giza is 5,900,000 MT. Contemplating a space solar power satellite today is probably analogous to contemplating the building of the large hydro‐electric dams, which even today cause observers to marvel. Today the United States initiates less than 15 launches per year (at 25MT or less). Construction of a single SBSP satellite alone would require in excess of 120 such launches. That may seem like an astounding operations tempo until one considers the volume of other transportation infrastructure. For instance, in 2005, Atlanta International Airport saw 980,197 takeoffs & landings alone, an average of 1,342 takeoffs/day, or about 1 every minute 24 hours a day. In the same year, Singapore’s 41 ship cargo berths served 130,318 vessel arrivals (about 15 per hour), handling about 1.15 billion gross tons (GT), and 23.2 million twenty foot equivalent units (TFUs).